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The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's First Decade 
Bert Chapman 
Abstract 
Concern over the safety of the United States' defense nuclear reactors in the 
late 1980s led to congressional creation of an independent oversight board. 
The Defense Nuclear Facility Safeties Board (DNFSB) is responsible for 
overseeing safety issues at the U.S. Department of Energy's nuclear facilities 
and issuing recommendations on operations and safety at these facilities, 
which include South Carolina's Savannah River Site, Texas' Pantex facility, 
Colorado's Rocky Flats Depot, and others. This article provides an historical 
overview of the DNFSB's first decade and discusses its relationship and 
interaction with the Department of Energy and congressional oversight 
committees as well as the recommendations it has issued on nuclear safety. 
An assessment of DNFSB's future prospects concludes the article. 
Keywords: U.S. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board; Defense nuclear facilities; U.S. Department of 
Energy defense programs; Nuclear weapons storage; Environmental policy; Public administration 
1. Introduction 
Developing a viable nuclear weapons arsenal was an essential component in the U.S. 
military victory over Japan during World War 11. Expanding and sustaining the 
credibility, quantity, and quality of this nuclear deterrent would also play a critical 
role in the United States' protracted, but ultimately triumphant, Cold War 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. Creating the technical and physical foundations 
of the infrastructure supporting this nuclear weapons development saw the creation of 
numerous facilities with diverse responsibilities at various locations nationwide. 
These facilities, under the guidance and generally secretive policies of agencies such 
as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE), succeeded in developing and maintaining an effectual American nuclear 
deterrent but at the price of significant environmental degradation1. 
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This environmental degradation occurred over the past 50 years as DOE and its 
predecessor agencies focused on nuclear weapons development, production, and 
testing at the expense of environmental safety. A 1994 U.S. government report 
provides a contextual assessment of some of the environmental costs of the nuclear 
weapons production: 
The nuclear weapons complex consists of 15 major facilities and a dozen or so 
smaller facilities at which production, research, and testing have occurred over 
the past five decades. In addition, DOE is responsible for environmental 
cleanup at thousands of sites formerly used in the weapons program and sites 
where uranium was processed. Altogether DOE must contend with more than 
100 million gallons of highly radioactive waste, 66 million gallons of waste 
contaminated with plutonium, and larger volumes of low-level radioactive 
waste. It also must deal with huge volumes of other toxic materials, including 
heavy metals, chemicals used as solvents, acids, and other materials that are 
difficult and costly to clean up2. 
The extent of DOE'S nuclear weapons complex is staggering. Its facilities are 
dispersed over 13 states covering 3,350 square miles and employ more than 100,000 
people. These individuals and facilities have been involved in responsibilities such as 
producing uranium materials, irradiating them in nuclear reactors, reprocessing those 
materials to separate weapons parts, manufacturing and finishing weapons 
components, weapons assembly and testing, researching and designing new weapons, 
and recycling parts of retired weapons3. 
Specific weapons-related work at these DOE facilities has generally been divided 
into four categories. Weapons research and development is performed at New 
Mexico's Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories and California's Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory. Production and processing of nuclear materials, such 
as plutonium and tritium, occur at the Hanford Plant in Washington and the Savannah 
River Site in South Carolina with supplemental uranium processing at Ohio's Feed 
Materials Production Center and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. 
Warhead component production occurs at Colorado's Rocky Flats Plant, Tennessee's 
Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Ohio's Mound Plant, Florida's Pinellas Plant, and 
Missouri's Kansas City Plant, culminating in final weapons assembly at Texas' 
Pantex Plant. Warhead testing at the Nevada Test Site rounds out the nuclear 
weapons production cycli .  
These weapons-producing complexes are in diverse natural and demographic 
settings. The possibility of environmental accidents at some of these sites, coupled 
with their proximity to significant population centers, illustrates the need for further 
understanding of public concern over operations at these facilities. The Rocky Flats 
plant is within 16 miles of downtown Denver, Boulder, and Golden, Colorado, with 
80,000 people living within three miles of its facilities. Approximately 140,000 
people live in close proximity to the Hanford facility which is also near the Columbia 
River and some 360,000 people live in Portland, Oregon, just 230 miles downstream 
from Hanford on the Columbia. The Savannah River Site and Tennessee's Oak Ridge 
Reservation are located near metropolitan areas such as Aiken, South Carolina, 
Augusta, Georgia, and Knoxville, ~ennessee'. 
A study of the environmental costs caused by weapons production at the Hanford Site re- 
veals that public concerns over environmental contamination from nuclear weapons produc- 
tion sites has some justification. Findings from this study, garnered from the 1986 release of 
DOE documents, demonstrate that radioactive and chemical wastes in billions of gallons, and 
over one billion cubic meters of gases were emitted since Hanford's opening in late 19446. 
This report also maintained that other consequences of toxic releases fiom Hanford in- 
cluded the following characteristics: 
In the hectic months of 1945 alone, 345,000 curies of radioiodine (1-13 1), generated by 
the chemical separation of plutonium from the irradiated fuel rods, was released into 
the atmosphere. This gas blew down the wind streams ("down-wind") of eastern Wash- 
ington: to the east, northeast, and south-east. The radioiodine also deposited on vegeta- 
tion throughout the region where it was available to cows and goats, which produced 
milk drunk by humans. . . . 
By 1955, eight single-pass (open coolant) nuclear reactors operated continuously at 
Hanford, . . . These reactors discharged billions of gallons of cooling water, laden with 
fission and activation products, to the river and to the ground. Through the rich aquatic 
life in the Columbia, as well as through the insects and waterfowl that bred in and fed 
on it, these radioactive wastes entered the food chain. . . . By the late 1950's, under- 
ground tanks holding the most toxic, concentrated, and long-lived radionuclides at Han- 
ford had begun to leak into the ground. Sometimes these releases have reached the wa- 
ter table7. 
Nuclear waste emitted from these sites has also proven to be a public policy, scientific, 
and political problem. Nuclear weapons site clean-up costs are estimated at over $100 billion8. 
Highly dangerous wastes temporarily stored near reactor sites must remain isolated from the 
biosphere for up to 10,000 years and beyond. Estimates of the total volume of high-level 
waste are for 41,000 metric tons by 2000 and nearly 87,000 metric tons by 2020. Public and 
political concern over this issue became more prominent during the 1980s with the revelation 
of significant chemical and radioactive contamination at DOE weapons plants and laborato- 
ries as a result of a historic neglect of health, safety, and environmental issues by DOE and 
its predecessor agencies at these facilities9. 
2. Major U.S. nuclear legislation 
Concern over the environmental consequences of this extensive contamination reached 
the attention of federal policymakers during the late 1980s. These individuals drafted, imple- 
mented, and enforced legislation to try to assuage public concerns about nuclear waste. It is 
instructive to look at major nuclear legislation enacted by the U.S. government prior to cre- 
ation of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) as a means of gaining histori- 
cal perspective on federal nuclear policies. 
The first major nuclear era statute, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, created the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) to promote and regulate the defense and commercial functions of 
the emerging nuclear industrylO. The President appointed the AEC's five members for five- 
year terms and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy oversaw commission operations. The 
AEC placed particular emphasis on maintaining secrecy about nuclear activities given their 
national security implications in the aftermath of World War I1 and the emerging Cold War 
confrontation with the Soviet Union'l. 
In 1954 the Atomic Energy Act was amended and updated". The new legislation opened 
the nuclear power industry to the private sector and established procedures for licensing 
commercial nuclear power plants. It also gave the United States the authority to enter into co- 
operative nuclear energy agreements with other nations but provided little concrete guidance 
on setting public health and safety standards for nuclear facilities despite the presence of 
vague language within the statute on this issue13. 
A third significant nuclear law was a 1957 amendment to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act 
known as the Price-Anderson ~ c t l ~ .  This legislation made preliminary recognition of the po- 
tential dangers to public safety involved in nuclear weapons production by establishing a 
$500 million liability h n d  as a supplement to an existing $60 million private h n d  to com- 
pensate nuclear accident victims. Price-Anderson also contained language protecting the nu- 
clear industry against unlimited liability if there were a catastrophic nuclear accidentI5. 
Concern over the U.S. vulnerability to the 1973 oil embargo and concern over the dis- 
persed energy-related activities of U.S. government agencies, led to the passage of the En- 
ergy Reorganization Act of 197416. This legislation created the Energy Research and Devel- 
opment Administration (ERDA) as a means of centralizing and enhancing the efficiency of 
federal energy activities and policies. It also abolished the AEC and replaced it by creating 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which assumed responsibility for regulatory 
oversight of commercial nuclear power plants. Administration of defense nuclear facilities 
was transferred to ERDA". Further energy policy centralization occurred with the 1977 pas- 
sage of the Department of Energy Organization Act creating the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE), which assumed responsibility for oversight of defense nuclear facilities". 
A final significant nuclear-related statute is the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 198219. The 
multiple provisions of this legislation included requiring the DOE to develop a comprehen- 
sive national policy for the interim storage and final disposal of commercial high-level radio- 
active waste, preparing and developing several possible waste storage facility sites within 
specified time periods, contracting with utilities to begin accepting waste at repositories on 
specified dates, assisting utilities with interim storage efforts through demonstrations of 
waste storage technologies, assuring sufficient managerial resources through creation of an - 
independent single-purpose waste management organization, and incorporating defense 
waste into these commercial programs20. 
The legal and policy environment of nuclear waste disposal was hrther complicated in the 
1980s through courtroom litigation. A particularly noteworthy development in this arena was 
an April 13, 1984, federal ruling by the Eastern District Court of Tennessee in the case Legal 
Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc, et. a!. v. Hodepl. A variety of environmental 
groups had filed suit against the DOE charging it with violating the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) provisions covering hazardous waste treatment, storage, trans- 
portation, and disposal along with provisions of the Clean Water Act in DOE operations of 
its nuclear weapons manufacturing Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. DOE argued that 
RCRA did not apply to Y-12 operations because the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) precluded 
state regulation of DOE, that the AEA places waste disposal authority with DOE, and that the 
AEA restricted dissemination of restricted nuclear weapons and materials data. However, 
Judge Robert L. Taylor rejected DOE's arguments, siding with the plaintiffs. Damages were 
not awarded in this case due to the national defense elements of Y-12's activities and DOE'S 
willingness to reduce environmental damage22. 
This ruling, nevertheless, contributed to creating a legal environment more conductive to 
litigation against governmental and private sector hazardous waste disposal activities. These 
nuclear statutes and further revelations about declining infrastructure and worker safety con- 
ditions at defense nuclear plants such as Rocky Flats2', would create sufficient impetus for 
the creation of an agency to examine conditions and operations thoroughly at DOE's defense 
nuclear facilities. 
3. Creating a conducive environment for a defense nuclear agency 
A significant factor contributing to the creation of a defense nuclear oversight agency was 
the Soviet Union's Chemobyl accident in April 1986 with secondary stimulus provided by 
the March 1979 Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania. These events provided vivid 
demonstrations of the immediate and long-term consequences of a nuclear facilities accident. 
Immediate and subsequent evidence compiled on Chemobyl demonstrated that radioactive 
fallout from the Chemobyl plant spread to countries as diverse and widespread as Poland, 
Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Finland24. Longer-term consequences of Chemo- 
by1 include Belarus receiving 70 percent of the accident's radioactive fallout, thyroid cancer 
among Belarussian children increasing by 285 times, Belarus devoting 25 percent of its gov- 
ernment budget to Chemobyl-related issues, 270 square miles of Ukraine contaminated with 
plutonium-239,4.6 million hectares of arable lands and 4.4 million hectares of Ukranian for- 
ests contaminated with radioactive residues, and about one million cubic meters of radioac- 
tive materials stored in Ukranian burial and temporary disposal sites25. 
Additional concern over the safety of U.S. nuclear plants was augmented by a long-stand- 
ing practice of secrecy by the government and private sector operators of U.S. defense and 
civilian nuclear power plants. A 1986 hearing by the House Energy and Commerce Commit- 
tee's Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power revealed that DOE and NRC offi- 
cials instructed nuclear safety experts at their agencies to not discuss the Chemobyl accident - 
with the press and to avoid comparing Chemobyl with U.S. nuclear reactors. The NRC also 
asked the subcommittee to keep secret details of accidents at 15 1 nuclear facilities in 14 
countries besides the United States and Soviet Union between 197 1 and 1 98426. 
The Chemobyl accident and growing concerns over the possible occurrence of such an ac- 
cident in the United States, coupled with the emergence of investigative reports on the envi- 
ronmental costs of nuclear plant emissions, would ensure the end of long-standing govem- 
ment and private sector secrecy concerning nuclear facility safety. A particularly important 
boost to legislative reform initiatives was the publication of a National Research Council re- 
port on defense nuclear facilities. 
Safety Issues At the Defense Production Reactors: A Report to the U.S. Department of En- 
ergy was released in 1987. This report was requested by Secretary of Energy John S. Her- 
rington to provide an independent assessment of Chernobyl's implications for safety at DOE 
reactors2'. Reviewers placed particular emphasis on safety and technical issues involving re- 
actors at Savannah River and Hanford. Overall investigation findings revealed that DOE had 
relied almost exclusively on private sector contractors to identify safety concerns and pro- 
pose remedial actions due to the superior expertise held in these areas by contractors instead 
of DOE personnel, that DOE's management approach to the mix of production and safety re- 
sponsibilities fell short of reasonable expectation; that DOE's production reactor safety over- 
sight was internal, not subject to public scrutiny, and vulnerable to DOE budget constraints. 
Investigation findings also led to the report's advocacy for an independent external safety 
oversight committee to be established to enhance public confidence in the safety of DOE de- 
fense production reactors, and that the majority of this committee's work should be unclassi- 
fied and publicly available. An additional study of DOE operations also revealed that indi- 
vidual DOE contractors developed their own standards and testing methods for hazardous 
waste disposal with none of these methods receiving DOE approval2*. 
Additional impetus for creation of a defense nuclear agency would also be provided by a 
1989 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee study, Early Health Problems of the U.S. Nzr- 
clear Weapons Indztstry and Their Implications For Today. Findings from this report demon- 
strated that high-level AEC officials were aware of serious public health problems arising 
from worker exposure to highly radioactive particles and gases at AEC facilities such as 
Hanford between 1947 and 1954. This report also determined that a Centers for Disease Con- 
trol (CDC) panel learned that the DuPont Company found Savannah River Plant workers ex- 
periencing excessive leukemia rates, that Oak Ridge National Laboratory workers faced in- 
creased risk of cancer death due to radiation exposures, that cancer deaths of Rocky Flats 
workers rose with increasing plutonium exposures, and that DOE's long-standing concern 
over legal liability had been an important deterrent affecting its health and safety research29. 
4. Creation of DNFSB 
These revelations of worker safety and health deficiencies at DOE nuclear facilities, coupled 
with public concern over a possible repetition of the Chemobyl accident and the National Re- 
search Council report documenting significant weaknesses in DOE defense reactor safety man- 
agement, created a political climate conducive to the introduction of reform legislation. The 100th - 
Congress would see the introduction of numerous pieces of DOE nuclear oversight legislation30. 
On April 9, 1987, Representative Norman Dicks (D-WA) introduced H.R. 2047 to estab- 
lish a Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Agency, which was referred to the House Armed 
Services and Energy and Commerce Committee3'. H.R. 2047 stressed that the Secretary of 
Energy would be required to provide any information requested by this agency. Its adminis- 
trator would be authorized to hold hearings, conduct depositions, issue subpoenas, and to be 
able to suspend operations or construction at new or existing defense nuclear facilities if the 
administrator determined public health or safety were not reasonably protected3'. 
Senator John Glenn (D-OH) introduced S. 1085, the Senate version of this legislation, on April 
23, 1987, as the Nuclear Protections and Safety Act of 198733. Testifying at a subsequent hearing, 
Glenn stated that the proposed defense nuclear safety agency would have six primary functions: 
1. Ensuring the implementation of current DOE health and safety standards. 
2. Issuing advisory recommendations in the content and application of DOE standards. 
3. Investigating events at DOE facilities that the agency considers important due to their 
potential or actual adverse impact on public health or safety. 
4. Recommending specific measures to prevent the occurrence of such events. 
5. Issuing periodic unclassified public reports with its recommendations and the decision 
to implement corrective steps at DOE facilities. 
6. Making recommendations and being consulted with to ensure that design, construction, 
health, and safety standards at DOE facilities are appropriate and comparable to those 
standards at comparable private sector nuclear f a ~ i l i t i e s ~ ~ .  
The Reagan administration provided a more mixed assessment of this legislation. At a 
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on this legislation, Energy Department Underse- 
cretary Joseph F. Salgado testified that DOE and the public would benefit from establishing 
an independent advisory board to oversee nuclear facility safety and emphasized DOE's ex- 
isting environmental, safety, and health programs as well as its commitment to improving 
safety conditions at its nuclear fa~ilities'~. 
Salgado went on to maintain, though, that establishing a new oversight agency would cre- 
ate a new and unnecessary regulatory bureaucracy, that the Secretary of Energy would not 
have the flexibility to respond to the new agency's recommendations, and neither the Secre- 
tary nor the President would be able to exercise their statutory responsibilities over the na- 
tion's nuclear weapons program. He also asserted that DOE must be given more authority to 
consider whether the cost-effectiveness of recommended changes go beyond essential safety 
standards, that the new agency be required to use clearly defined safety goals in its recom- 
mendations, and that accountability was achievable through clearer performance standards 
and a process inviting public input and informing Congress of planned actions36. 
Title I of S. 1085 (the section creating an independent nuclear safety board) was reported by 
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on September 24, 1987, and referred to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee3'. This panel expressed concerns about the Governmental Affairs 
Committee's report on S. 1085. Armed Services Committee members questioned what they saw 
as a lack of clear priorities in the board's mission, the possibility that overly stringent safety stan- 
dards could be applied by the board, and the considerable powers given the board provided it 
"with significant authority but insufficient responsibility for the consequences of its actionsw3'. 
Consequently, S. 1085's language was revised during five hearings held by the Senate - 
Armed Services Committee in late 1987. This panel ultimately produced a report that estab- 
lished an organization with the following modus operandi: 
The basic goals in establishing an independent safety oversight board are to assure and 
enhance the safety of operations of DOE's nuclear facilities and to restore public confi- 
dence that these facilities are operated without undue risk to public safety and health. 
The Committee does not believe that a safety board is a panacea for all DOE safety 
problems, or that it can in any way absolve the Secretary or the Department's contrac- 
tors of their fundamental safety responsibilities. In fact, many witnesses testified that 
DOE's shortcomings largely reside within the Department's line management, and that 
there can be no substitute for capable and committed line management. 
What the Board can do is provide critical expertise, technical vigor, and a sense of vigi- 
lance within the Department at all levels. The Board should be instrumental in helping 
DOE to develop appropriate and operationally meaninghl safety standards, and in ensur- 
ing their translation into clear and consistent requirements for DOE management and con- 
tractors. The Board should assist in further developing and broadening facility risk assess- 
ments and in measuring those risks against safety standards. With reasonable safety criteria 
as an objective basis for evaluation, the Board should also help the Secretary make sound 
modernization decisions. Above all, the Board must have a primary mission to identify the 
nature and consequences of any significant potential threats to public health and safety, to 
elevate such issues to the highest levels of authority, and to inform the public39. 
Following these revisions and subsequent negotiations between Congress and the Reagan 
administration, S. 1085 was incorporated into the Department of Defense authorization bill 
for Fiscal Year 1989. It received final congressional approval from the House and Senate on 
September 28, 1988. President Reagan signed the legislation the next daflo. 
4.1. Problematic pzrblic opinion on nuclear waste disposal 
Numerous political problems confronted the DNFSB as it began setting up operations. 
The most important of these was deep public skepticism toward government institutions and 
those institutions involved in the disposal of nuclear waste. This skepticism received further 
reinforcement from the historically close relationship between DOE and its nuclear plant 
contractors, which saw DOE grant these contractors broad exemptions from financial and le- 
gal liability, providing significant financial awards to contractor employees at Rocky Flats 
despite DOE recognition of serious environmental and safety problems at that site, and DOE 
paying for contractor fines and penalties4'. 
Additional public displeasure stems from diverging cost estimates for cleaning up DOE'S 
nuclear weapons complex. A 1991 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond assessment men- 
tioned divergent DOE and General Accounting Office (GAO) assessments of the cost in the 
range of $100-130 billion but also hypothesized that annual expenditures of $5 billion for 20 
years might be required42. 
The most visible manifestations of public displeasure toward government institutions saw 
the growth of public fear about risks affiliated with nuclear power and waste due to leaks at 
military storage facilities like the Hanford Plant, growing quantities of nuclear waste and - 
storage space shortage at existing reactor sites, and the emergence of an avowed antinuclear 
movement in the United States following the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident43. 
An example of a local demonstration of public opposition to nuclear waste disposal is at 
Nevada's Yucca Mountain. DOE had selected this site with congressional approval, as the 
nation's principal nuclear waste repository due to its distance from population centers and 
geographic isolation. Opposition to this decision from the State of Nevada was significant 
and resulted in a deterioration of relations between the state and DOE culminating with the 
Nevada legislature passing legislation vetoing placement of the repository in Nevada and 
banning highly radioactive waste storage within the state. This, in turn, led to courtroom liti- 
gation, which, although unsuccessful from Nevada's perspective, resulted in de facto termi- 
nation of DOE activity at this site as the 1980s ended44. 
4.2. Setting up operations 
This accumulated climate of public skepticism ranks as a significant backdrop to DN- 
FSB's initial operating environment. As the DNFSB began operations in late 1989 and early 
1990, it is important to understand what the agency perceived as its institutional purpose. In 
its first annual report to the Congress, the DNFSB used the following language to describe its 
raison d'etre: 
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. . . was created to provide advice and for- 
mal recommendations to the President and Secretary of Energy regarding public health 
and safety issues at Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. By statute, 
the Board is required to review and evaluate the content and implementation of health 
and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, 
operation, and decommissioning of DOE defense nuclear facilities. The Board must 
then recommend to the Secretary of Energy any specific measures, such as changes in 
the content and implementation of those standards, that the Board believes should be 
adopted to ensure that the public health and safety are adequately protected. The Board 
is also required to review the design of all new defense nuclear facilities before con- 
struction begins, and recommend modifications necessary to protect health and safety. 
Board review and advisory responsibilities continue throughout the construction, test- 
ing, and operation of new facilities. 
More broadly, the Board reviews operations, practices, and occurrences at DOE de- 
fense nuclear facilities and makes appropriate recommendations to protect health and 
safety. In the event that any aspect of operations, practices, or occurrences reviewed by 
the Board is determined to present an imminent or severe threat to public health or 
safety, the Board transmits its recommendations directly to the   resident“'. 
Following the swearing in of presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed members Ed- 
son Case, John Conway (Board Chair), John Crawford, Jr., A.J. Eggenberger, and Herbert 
Kouts, DNFSB operations began by visiting various DOE defense nuclear facilities to be- 
come acquainted with their operational issues. The first visit of DNFSB board members and 
accompanying expert consultants was to Savannah River from November 7-9, 1989. During 
this visit board members and the consultants examined plant operations and practices in seis- 
mic engineering, thermal-hydraulics, reactor piping and vessel integrity, operator training 
and qualification, and overall plant operational  standard^^^. Board members paid particular 
attention to the ability of the K, L, and P reactors at Savannah River to resist seismic and 
other external events that could potentially jeopardize public safety. These reactors would 
play an important role in DNFSB's first recommendation to DOE4'. 
DNFSB board members paid additional exploratory visits to the Rocky Flats Plant, the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico, and Hanford during their early activ- 
ities. Board members visited Rocky Flats the week of January 15, 1990, to gain knowledge of 
plant operations and potential public health and safety problems such operations might cause. 
During their visit, Board members met with Colorado Governor Roy Roemer, Representative 
David Skaggs, representatives from diverse citizen organizations with environmental and nu- 
clear proliferation concerns, and labor union officials representing Rocky Flats w0rke1-s~~. 
The January 1990 visit to WIPP saw presentations from senior Westinghouse and DOE 
officials about the project's history and current management issues it faced. Board members 
toured the Waste Handling Building and underground areas used for experiments and site 
characterization. Plans were made for follow-up visits including those from expert consult- 
ants and board staff personnel. Three board members visited Hanford from December 1 1-13, 
1989. They witnessed presentations by Richland Operations Office personnel and Westing- 
house contractors on ongoing site clean-up activities, preparations for Purex Plant operations 
restarting, activity on the N-Reactor's dry standby status, Plutonium Finishing Plant work, 
and the possibility that existing high-level waste storage tanks might be subject to chemical 
explosion based on a concern expressed to the Board by Senator John Glenn (D-OH)49. 
Data derived from these initial site visits led to the issuance of the Board's first recom- 
mendation on February 22, 1990. This document (Recommendation 90-1) dealt with opera- 
tor training at Savannah River prior to restarting that facility's K, L, and P reactors. Recom- 
mendation 90- 1 advised that DOE: 
determine and specify the qualifications reactor plant operators and supervisors had to 
demonstrate before restarting the these reactors, 
identify any differences between its approved qualifications and those adopted by NRC 
for comparable civilian nuclear power positions, and 
conduct a comprehensive review of reactor operator and supervisor qualifications using 
written and oral exams in order to determine requisite training and knowledge for reac- 
tor restart. 
It was also recommended that: 
there be accelerated implementation of a configuration management program to assure 
drawings of safety-related systems and procedures are available for operators and super- 
visors, and 
operators and supervisors are qualified in procedures to be used for normal operations 
and emergency situations50. 
Secretary of Energy James Watkins accepted Recommendation 90-1 on April 10, 1990, 
and his plan to implement this recommendation was received by DNFSB on July 13, 1990. 
The Board would be also be involved in follow-up monitoring of DOE implementation of 
this and subsequent recommendations it would issue5'. 
4.3. GAO evaluafion of DNFSB'sfirsf year 
A landmark development at the end of DNFSB's first year was the issuance of a General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report evaluating its first year of operations. Released in February 
199 1, this report was generally favorable in its assessment of the Board. The report noted that 
the Board had: 
established financial operations, 
issued recommendations involving major DOE facilities at Hanford, Rocky Flats, Sa- 
vannah River, and WIPP, and 
addressed issues such as operator training, safety standards, and radioactive waste storage52. 
GAO noted that DNFSB was limited in its ability to cany out its functions by being un- 
able to offer sufficient salaries to attract qualified scientific and technical staff as reflected in 
the presence of only 10 technical staffers as of December 10, 1990. The report also noted that 
these salary restraints were no longer in effect due to the November 1990 passage of Public 
Law 101-5 10, giving DNFSB the requisite hiring authority to attract desired  employee^^^. 
The GAO report also noted weaknesses in DNFSB practices. It stressed the need for the 
Board to ensure its independence from DOE, documenting its activities in ways conducive to 
congressional oversight and public information access, and to plan for future work priorities. 
Specific recommendations fiom GAO stressed that: 
DNFSB include written criteria to determine when DOE defense nuclear facility health 
and safety concerns would result in the issuance of formal recommendations to the Sec- 
retary of Energy, 
all hiring and contractual arrangements be reviewed to determine potential conflicts of 
interest between DOE and the contractor, 
DNFSB notify the public of all situations where potential conflict of interest situations 
are unavoidable and in the government's best interest, 
document all safety and health issue reviews of defense nuclear facilities including 
board meetings, discussions, analysis, and agreements with DOE, and 
DNFSB's Chair direct preparation of a strategic plan for identifying future Board work 
areas54. 
The DNFSB agreed with many of the GAO report recommendations. However, it took is- 
sue with the report's admonition that it stay "at arms length" from DOE by maintaining that 
oversight agencies such as GAO, agency Inspector General offices, and congressional com- 
mittees work best when they are able to work in cooperation with officials of the agency un- 
der scrutiny. DNFSB contended that its not having an adversarial relationship with DOE and 
that it was not indicative of a failure to maintain its independence from DOE. Board mem- 
bers also criticized the usefulness of written procedures for determining when its recommen- 
dations were essential for adequate public health and safety by stating that a variety of cir- 
cumstances could result in its issuing such  recommendation^^^. 
Despite its disagreement with GAO recommendations in the aforementioned areas, the 
Board made a concrete demonstration of its commitment to public information access by cre- 
ating a public reading room, providing information on Board activities through the reading 
room and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, opening public meetings under the 
Government in Sunshine Acts6, allowing public comment on Board recommendations, and 
consulting with workers' representatives at defense nuclear facilities and the general public s7. 
4.4. DNFSB site recommendations 
The recommendations DNFSB has issued and DOE has implemented are important to un- 
derstand how defense nuclear policies are carried out by both of these organizations. These rec- 
ommendations come about fiom ongoing site visits by DNFSB personnel to DOE defense nu- 
clear facilities and are intended to correct ongoing or potential operational shortcomings that 
have the potential to threaten public safety. Examining the nature and content of these recom- 
mendations can be demonstrated by the following summary of DNFSB recommendations to- 
ward specific defense nuclear facilities such as Savannah River, Rocky Flats, and Hanford. 
4.4.1. Savannah River recommendations 
Problems at the Savannah River site have played an ongoing role in DNFSB oversight activ- 
ities and would often be a featured subject of the Board's attention. The first recommendation 
issued in conjunction with Savannah River activities and operations was Recommendation 9 1-2 
on March 27, 199 1, and concerned resolving safety issues prior to restarting the K-reactor. 
Specific contents of this recommendation were that each closure package describing the rea- 
sons for the K-reactor shutdown in the Reactor Operations Management Plan (ROMP) contain 
a succinct narrative discussion clarifying the meaning of the issue in question, describing steps 
taken to resolve past practice deficiencies, stating the reason for maintaining that closure pack- 
ages have been achieved, that referenced documents support closure claims, and that DOE re- 
turn to filly reviewing and concurring with determinations for each closure issues8. 
Recommendation 91-5 grappled with power limits for K-Reactor operations. Issued on 
December 19, 199 1, this recommendation reviewed plans for this reactor, which included 
limiting its power to 30 percent (approximately 720 megawatts) of what had historically been 
its fill  operating power. DNFSB concludcd that operation of this reactor at this 30 percent 
maximum would not impose an undue risk to public health and safety if all other rcquisite 
startup measures were completed and effectively i m ~ l e m e n t e d ~ ~ .  
Additional provisions of this recommendation included DOE conducting more definitive 
studies on thermal-hydraulic methodology, criteria, and experimental test programs used in 
analyzing K-reactor core-cooling performance during unusual conditions, that any proposal 
to operate K-reactor at a level above 30 percent be supported by revised accident analysis 
thermal-hydraulic methodology, and that the evaluation model for postulated coolant acci- 
dent loss be documented and controlled in accordance with Code of Federal Regrlations Ti- 
tle 10, Section 50.46 standards". 
The issuance of Recommcndation 92-1 on May 2 1, 1992, saw DNFSB recommend that 
DOE defer resuming processing of the HB-Line of reactors pending issuance of a report on 
various safety and operational issues6'. Eight days later DNFSB would issue a more detailed 
recommendation on this issue. Recommendation 92-3 asserted that the following steps 
should be taken prior to resuming HB-Line operations: 
1. DOE direct its Westinghouse contractor to reopen its operational readiness review 
(ORR) in accordance with previous DNFSB recommendations and DOE implementa- 
tion plans at other facilities. 
2. Establishing comprehensive criteria documents for judging and measuring reactor re- 
start readiness. 
3. Westinghouse issue a Readiness to Proceed Memorandum requesting DOE approval to 
resume operations once it completed its ORR and determined appropriate safety issues 
are resolved. 
4. DOE providing appropriate assistance to Westinghouse as it conducts the ORR. 
5. A DOE ORR team conduct an independent and comprehensive ORR for HB-Line after 
Westinghouse conducts an ORR and issues a Readiness to Proceed Memorandum re- 
questing DOE approval for operations resumption. 
6. That DOE's ORR team consist of individuals experienced with all operational facets 
and be independent of HB-Line management responsibilities to achieve independent 
and unbiased assessments. 
7. DOE and Westinghouse should prepare for the ORR by ensuring accident analyses in- 
clude all credible scenarios, identifying appropriate on-site and off-site accident miti- 
gation systems, and that updated Fire Hazards Analysis information is consistent with 
accident analyses. 
8. Westinghouse and DOE should complete their compliance assessment of DOE safety 
orders at HB-Line and implement requisite compensatory measures to achieve order 
compliance and safe resumption of HB-Line  operation^^^. 
Recommendation 96-1, issued on August 14, 1996, dealt with Savannah River's In-Tank 
Precipitation System. This particular system plays an important role in removing high-level 
radioactive waste from storage tanks at this site. In this recommendation, DNFSB advised 
against proceeding with a process verification test without better understanding of benzene 
mechanisms formation, generation, and release, and that additional investigative effort 
should uncover the reason for the apparent decomposition of tetraphenylborate compounds, 
establish the chemical and physical mechanisms determining the extent of benzene retention 
in the waste slurry, and affirm the adequacy of existing safety measures". 
4.4.2. Rocky Flats recommendutions 
DOE operations at Rocky Flats have long been a source of concern. A major fire in Build- 
ings 776-777 during 1969 stemmed from the ignition of a briquette of machine turnings. This 
fire would ultimately produce several fire safety improvements throughout DOE's weapons 
complex including the area of plutonium metal fabricatiod4. Plutonium storage pits were 
produced at Rocky Flats until 1989. Many environmentally dangerous chemicals can no 
longer be used for production and some of Rocky Flats' older technological processes cannot 
be transferred or reproduced consequently leaving significant quantities of dangerous pluto- 
nium waste at Rocky Flats65. 
These and other Rocky Flats problems would culminate in a June 1992 plea bargain agree- 
ment between Rocky Flats contractor, the Rockwell Corporation, and the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) following a five-year investigation by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) against Rockwell. This investigation 
found that DOE and Rockwell failed to produce an adequate waste disposal analysis plan, 
did not store waste with a permit as required by the Resource Conservation Recovery Act 
(RCRA), failed to maintain an accurate operations record, and failed to provide written noti- 
fication of incidents requiring a contingency plad6. 
This background of environmental and legal troubles influenced DNFSB's Rocky Flats 
activities. Its first recommendation covering Rocky Flats operations was issued May 3, 
1990. Recommendation 90-4 decreed that there be an independent assessment of the ade- 
quacy and correctness of utility systems operating procedures at Rocky Flats, the need for 
an assessment of the knowledge level acquired during operator requalification, that test 
records and safety systems be examined and calibrated, all plant changes and vital safety 
system modifications be reviewed for potential impact on procedures, training, and requali- 
fication, and that examinations of each building's final safety analysis report ensure that 
plant description, procedures, and accident analysis are consistent with the plant and safety 
related modificationsh7. 
Two weeks later the Board issued follow-up Recommendation 90-5. Focusing on Rocky 
Flats Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), this pronouncement advised that Rocky Flats' 
SEP address and consider the effects of severe external developments such as seismic events 
and high winds on plant operations, the effects of severe internal events such as fire, ventila- 
tion system performance under severe external and internal events, equipment and structural 
interaction under such events, and the basis and procedures for implementing facility 
changesh8. 
Recommendation 90-6, dated June 4, 1990, provides another demonstration of the empha- 
sis DNFSB placed on Rocky Flats during its initial months. This recommendation examined 
criticality safety. It urged that DOE prepare a written program with commitments for ad- 
dressing the cumulation of fissile and other ventilation duct materials prior to resuming plu- 
tonium operations. This program also needed to include a description of remediation actions 
deemed necessary for DOE resumption of plutonium operations at Rocky Flats, descriptions 
and justification of non-destructive assay techniques, calibration, modeling, and methodol- 
ogy, and estimating gamma ray and fast neutron radiation levels in occupancy areas69. 
Additional stipulations of Recommendation 90-6 included determinations of requisite de- 
sign and operational changes in ventilation ducts and related systcrns to precludc hrther fissile 
material cumulation that could threaten public health and safety and establishing a monitoring 
program to guarantee the effectiveness of ventilation duct design and operational changes7'. 
Recommendation 9 1-4, issued on September 30, 199 1, noted that some corrective actions had 
been taken at Rocky Flats. This document went on to advise that DOE complete an Operational 
Readiness Review (ORR) for Building 559, that there be an assessment of knowledge levels 
achieved during operator requalification, that test records and safety calibration systems be exam- 
ined, verification that all plant changes involving vital safety systems be reviewed for potential 
impacts on procedures and training, and that the ORR team's final report include description of 
remaining issues needing resolution before Building 559 can resume plutonium operations7'. 
September 26, 1994, saw DNFSB issue Recommendation 94-3 on Rocky Flats dealing 
with Building 371. This building was considered Rocky Flats' prime sight for plutonium 
storage. In its recommendation, DNFSB espoused the development of an integrated plan to 
address civil, structural, and seismic safety issues and evaluations concerning the planned 
plutonium storage use of Building 37 1, that this plan address and explain required changes to 
the current Safety Analysis Report, and how such changes would be accomplished. Addi- 
tional stipulations of this recommendation included comprehensive structural analysis and 
methodology of building analysis standards as applied to Building 37 1, that hazard classifi- 
cation for this structure be supported by rational analysis, the classification of safety systems, 
the use of standards for evaluating natural and man-made hazards be similar to those used in 
commercial nuclear practice, and that program plan results be used to specify building up- 
grades consistent with Building 37 1's mission72. 
4.4.3. Hanford recommendations 
Hanford received early and frequent visits from DNFSB members during the Board's ini- 
tial year of operations. An early topic of Board interest at Hanford was the susceptibility of 
old single-shell high-level waste tanks to spontaneous explosion, which could release a large 
amount of radioactive material to the surrounding environment. During its investigations of 
this possibility at Hanford, the Board concluded that the possibility of such an explosion was 
low. At the same time, though, Board members held lingering concerns about uncertainty 
over the composition of Hanford waste tanks contents and their physical conditions. 
These residual concerns led the DNFSB to issue Recommendation 90-3 on March 27, 1990. 
This recommendation advocated studying possible chemical reactions that could be the source 
of heat generation in Hanford's single-shell tanks, that DOE develop a continuous monitoring 
program to indicate possible development of unstable conditions in these tanks, providing alarm 
indicators in monitoring instruments to facilitate talung action to neutralize perceived abnormal- 
ities, and developing an action to plan to neutralize conditions signaled by these alarms73. 
DNFSB received notification of DOE's decision to comply with Recommendation 90-3 
on May 10, 1990, and the Board received DOE's implementation plan for this recommenda- 
tion on August 10, 1990. DNFSB members, though, decided that DOE's implementation 
plan was "insufficiently responsive" to its earlier recommendations. Consequently, they is- 
sued Recommendation 90-7 on October 1 1, 199074. 
Reflecting the Board's intent that their earlier recommendations be adhered to, this partic- 
ular recommendation went into considerable detail. Specific provisions included the need for 
immediate steps to be taken to add necessary single-shell tank instrumentation to establish 
whether hot spots exist or may develop in the stored waste, installing instrumentation to 
monitor cover gas composition and the possible presence of flammable gas, accelerating tank 
sampling contents programs, the need for a program to study the possibility of a violent 
chemical waste reaction, developing an action plan to neutralize conditions that may be sig- 
naled by alarms, and formulating and instituting a separate emergency plan in the event of an 
explosion or airborne release of radioactive material to protect onsite and external personne17j. 
The Board's next recommendation for Hanford was issued on July 6, 1992. Recommenda- 
tion 92-4 dealt with a projected Multi-Function Waste Tank (MFWT) to be located at Han- 
ford as a part of an existing tank waste remedial system program. DNFSB recommended that 
MFWT's design needed to be conservative in terms of safety and that it have clearly defined 
and coherent design criteria. Its design, construction, and start-up activities were to be exe- 
cuted by individuals who could provide the requisite quality for public health and safety pro- 
tection. Additional components of this recommendation included advocacy of design conti- 
nuity through all project phases, the responsible DOE organization having technically 
qualified personnel involved, participating DOE and contractor organizations having their 
functions and responsibilities clearly delineated in a single document, and identifying the de- 
sign bases and engineering principles for the MFWT project that will show MFWT meeting 
existing quantitative safety goals of DOE's Nuclear Safety Policy76. 
The following year saw the issuance of Recommendation 93-5 concerning Hanford opera- 
tions. Covering Hanford waste tanks characterization studies, this recommendation alluded to a 
recently released DOE audit noting significant weaknesses in Hanford's sampling, laboratory, 
and core management activities. Specific aspects of this recommendation were that DOE en- 
gage in a comprehensive reexamination and restructuring of Hanford characterization efforts 
and sampling schedules, develop a prioritized schedule of tanks to be sampled, increase labora- 
tory capacity and activities dedicated to tank sample analysis, and explore the possible utility of 
on-site and off-site laboratory services. Supplemental components of this recommendation in- 
cluded integrating the characterization effort into the tank waste remediation system engineer- 
ing effort, critically examining the list of chemical analyses to the smallest set needed to hlfill 
safety requirements, and strengthening the management and conduct of sampling  operation^^^. 
4.5. Other DNFSB recommendations 
Although Savannah kver ,  Rocky Flats, and Hanford have been the subject of much DNFSB 
activity and recommendations, other defense nuclear facilities and subjects have also received 
DNFSB scrutiny. One of these facilities is DOE'S Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) located 
near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Congress authorized this controversial facility in 1979 to dispose 
of transuranic wastes generated during nuclear weapons production and to demonstrate that nu- 
clear waste disposal facilities could protect the environment and public safety78. 
Introductory exploration and investigation of WIPP operations led the Board to issue Recom- 
mendation 9 1-3 on April 25, 199 1. Contents of ths  recommendation required that DOE authorize 
an independent and comprehensive readiness review at WIPP before testing waste disposal proce- 
dures, that team members canying out the readiness review be experienced in all facets of the op- 
erations involved and be independent of WIPP. The readiness review team was to confer with 
other DOE readiness review teams. Additional recommendation components stipulated assessing 
the adequacy and correctness of normal and emergency waste handling and utility systems proce- 
dures, assessing the knowledge level achieved during operator qualification reviews, assessing 
operational issues such as the interrelationships, delineated roles, and responsibilities among con- 
tractor and DOE units at Carlsbad and Sandia National Laboratory on issues involving WIPP79. 
Recommendation 92-6, dealing with operational readiness reviews, was issued on August 
26, 1992. This recommendation advised that DOE quickly develop effective rules, proce- 
dures, orders, and directives to govern safety aspects of this review process, develop specific 
criteria for determining when ORRs are or are not required, and that the plan for each ORR 
incorporate such features as review team members not being involved in the work under re- 
view and an assessment of the technical qualifications of DOE field organization members 
providing direction and guidance to the participating contractors0. 
Four weeks later on September 22, 1992, DNFSB issued Recommendation 92-7. This 
document sought to issue guidance on the qualifications of technical personnel and supervi- 
sors and defense nuclear facilities. Its contents were particularly motivated by its determina- 
tion that there were many individuals at such facilities lacking understanding of fundamental 
elements of engineering, chemistry, nuclear physics, and radiation protection to operate and 
maintain these sites safely. An additional finding buttressing this recommendation was that 
written examinations at many sites often consisted of unchallenging multiple choice and 
short answer questions that failed to assess adequately operator knowledge or correlate basic 
engineering principles with job-specific knowledge requirementss1. 
The Board recommended the following steps to resolve what it saw as training and quali- 
fication deficiencies at defense nuclear facilities: 
DOE take timely action to expand senior management's involvement in implementing 
training programs at defense nuclear facilities and enhancing senior management's 
communication of the importance of effective training and qualification programs to all 
levels in relevant DOE and contractor organizations. 
DOE strengthen organizational units responsible for training and qualification at all ap- 
plicable DOE entities. 
Accelerate internal DOE efforts to improve training and qualifications programs of op- 
erations, maintenance and technical support personnel at defense nuclear facilities. 
DOE and its contractors establish and implement measures to improve training and quali- 
fication programs as specified in Recommendation 90- 1 concerning Savannah Rivers2. 
A related concern for personnel technical quality was also demonstrated in Recommenda- 
tion 93-3 issued on June 1, 1993. In this document, the DNFSB advocated DOE establish a 
means to attract and retain exceptional scientific and technical personnel as a primary agency 
goal, that DOE seek excepted appointment authority for selected key engineering and scien- 
tific personnel in DOE program offices, line units, and defense nuclear complex oversight 
units, and that the Department develop a system for using personnel attrition to build techni- 
cal capability. Additional recommendation provisions included reviewing the effectiveness 
of the technical employees performance appraisal system, using respected independent exter- 
nal organizations such as the National Research Council to assess DOE'S present and 
planned hture actions for attracting and retaining qualified technical personnel, perform an 
in-depth assessment of educational and experience requirements for key positions, and eval- 
uate incumbents for their ability to meet qualification requirements". 
Additional documentation of DNFSB concern about defense nuclear personnel technical 
qualification issues is reflected in the December 10, 1993, issuance of Recommendation 93-6. 
Dealing with maintaining access to nuclear weapons expertise in the defense nuclear complex, it 
placed particular emphasis on the need for retaining personnel with such knowledge for nuclear 
weapons disassembly at the Pantex site near Amarillo, Texas, and for nuclear explosives testing 
at the Nevada Test Sites4. 
Provisions of this recommendation included that DOE initiate a formal process to identify 
the skills and knowledge needed to develop or verify safe dismantling or modification proce- 
dures for all remaining U.S. nuclear weapons types, start a similar process to identify the requi- 
site skills and knowledge to conduct nuclear testing operations safely, review the personnel 
losses at nuclear weapons labs and the Nevada Test Site to determine which skills would be lost 
though personnel departure, and that DOE and defense nuclear contractors negotiate the con- 
tinuing availability of personnel scheduled to leave whose skills and knowledge are determined 
to be important. Subsequent recommendation stipulations were the initiation of programs to ob- 
tain and record from these personnel undocumented anecdotal technical information that would 
enhance the technical knowledge of hture personnel, developing procedures for safe weapons 
system disassembly while personnel with such expertise are still available, instituting a pro- 
gram for maintaining operational expertise for nuclear weapons testing if such testing is re- 
sumed in the future at the Nevada Test Site, and determining if traditional dependence on ad- 
ministrative controls to ensure nuclear explosive safety is adequate given the loss of 
experienced personnel and the potential future resumption of nuclear testings5. 
Safety management is an integral component of DNFSB's institutional purpose and this 
subject, as applied to DOE nuclear facilities, constitutes the heart of Recommendation 95-2 
issued October 1 1, 1995. This recommendation, replacing Recommendations 90-2 and 92-5, 
saw DNFSB recommend that DOE institutionalize the process of incorporating environmen- 
tal, safety, and health objectives and controls into the planning and execution of all major de- 
fense nuclear activity involving hazardous materials, requiring all operations and activities 
involving radioactive and other substantially hazardous substances in the defense nuclear 
complex to be subjected to appropriately graded Safety Management Plans, establishing a 
new list of facilities and activities prioritized on hazard and importance to defense clean-up 
activities, promulgating requirements and instructions for carrying out such clean-up and 
safety programs, and taking necessary measures to ensure that DOE has or acquires the tech- 
nical expertise required to implement the recommended streamlined processR6. 
Another noteworthy DNFSB recommendation is Recommendation 97-1. Issued on March 
3, 1997, this document deals with the Uranium-233 (U-233) storage safety at DOE facilities. 
U.S. stockpiles of this man-made uranium isotope of approximately one ton arc in DOE's pos- 
session and its applications included DOE's defense-related activities and nuclear reactor pro- 
grams supported by DOE and commercial companies. U-233's storage under conditions in 
which its physical deterioration can occur and the multifaceted responsibility for U-233 
throughout DOE prompted DNFSB's issuance of this recommendation. Provisions of this rec- 
ommendation were that DOE establish a single organizational project to deal with U-233 safe 
storage issues, develop packaging, transport, and interim and long-term storage standards for 
U-233, characterize the quantity and condition of U-233 in DOE defense nuclear facilities, 
evaluate the appropriateness and condition of DOE's vaults and U-233 storage systems, ini- 
tiate a program to remedy observed shortfalls in DOE's ability to maintain U-233 in accept- 
able interim storage, establish a plan of measures for eventually placing U-233 in safe perma- 
nent storage, and take measures to ensure that DOE retains the requisite technical knowledge 
and competence to carry out safe U-233 shortage on a short- and long-term basiss7. 
4.6. Recommendations summary 
Board recommendations encompass the diverse array of activities at DOE's defense nu- 
clear facilities. Many of these recommendations deal with specific operational issues at indi- 
vidual facilities such as reactor safety at Savannah River and plutonium storage usage at 
Rocky Flats. Other recommendations have dealt with potential hture issues such as crisis 
management at individual facilities and taking measures to ensure that facility and contractor 
workforce personnel possess the requisite technical expertise for managing defense nuclear 
facilities. The detailed nature of these recommendations and the carehl thought and analysis 
underlying these documents testifies to the importance Board members place upon their in- 
trinsic intellectual credibility and upon fulfilling the Board's statutory obligation to ensure 
the safety of the United States' defense nuclear facilities. 
5. Other noteworthy developments 
A significant demonstration of DNFSB's high credibility with DOE is the Secretary of 
Energy's acceptance of all 38 Board recommendations issued during the DNFSB's institu- 
tional life even though Congress granted it action-forcing instead of regulatory powers. DOE 
has completed implementation of a majority of Board recommendations and is making 
progress completing those that have not been implementedgg. 
DNFSB carried out 300 site visits to DOE nuclear facilities in 1998 and Board members, 
staff, and contractor experts had made 1,398 cumulative site visits to these facilities between 
October 1989 and the end of 1998. These activities have also been carried out in an environ- 
ment of ongoing administrative upheaval in DOE'S highest echelons which is influenced by 
the political upheaval experienced by DOE during this period and by normal upper-level ad- 
ministrative turnover in cabinet departments. Documentation of this politically based insta- 
bility is demonstrated by the presence of seven Secretaries or Acting Secretaries of Energy, 
six different Deputy or Acting Deputy Secretaries (a seventh has been nominated), and seven 
Under or Acting Under Secretaries of Energy during DNFSB's nine years of operationg9. 
In contrast to this high-level administrative turnover in DOE, DNFSB Board membership 
has remained remarkably stable. Three of the Board's five initial members (Conway, Eggen- 
berger, and Kouts) have been reappointed, reconfirmed, and remain members a decade later. 
Board member Edson Case died in 1991. Joseph DiNunno replaced Case upon Senate confir- 
mation in 199290. John Mansfield, whose nomination, confirmation, and swearing in oc- 
curred in October and November 1997, replaced John Crawford9'. 
Although legally authorized to hire up to 150 hll-timc employees, the Board had hired 
only 90 full-time staff in addition to the five Board members to accomplish its activities by 
the beginning of 1999. Technical staff personnel have extensive experience in fields such as 
physics and nuclear, mechanical, electrical, chemical, structural, and metallurgical engineer- 
ing. Twenty-five percent of the Board's technical staff possess Ph.D. degrees and an addi- 
tional 72 percent have masters degrees. This educational experience is hrther augmented by 
staffers having practical nuclear experience from the U.S. Navy's nuclear propulsion pro- 
gram, the nuclear weapons field, and the civilian reactor industryg2. 
5.1. Controversy over external regulation 
The political currents of larger agencies can affect the operations of smaller agencies that 
are supervised by the larger agency or have significant interaction with a larger agency. Po- 
litical winds buffeting DOE during the 1990s affected DNFSB. Already documented in- 
stances of inept and imprudent nuclear materials handling by DOE, its predecessors, and 
contractors at DOE'S defense nuclear complex created an environment conducive to congres- 
sional criticism of DOE operations. 
One manifestation of these attacks on DOE nuclear policy came during the 103rd Con- 
gress (1993-1994). On February 28, 1994, Representative George Miller (D-CA), then chair 
of the House Committee on Natural Resources, introduced H.R. 3920. This bill, known as 
the "Federal Nuclear Facilities Licensing and Regulation Act," would have required the 
NRC to license all new DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities9'. Its provisions also 
provided for the creation of a presidential commission to review options for regulating exist- 
ing DOE nuclear facilities, including the possibility of independent regulation. Although this 
commission's membership would include the DNFSB chair or a designated representative, 
the provision of the proposed bill creating a presidential study commission was dismissed by 
the Board as "duplicative and time-consumingwg4. 
The House Natural Resources Committee held hearings on H.R. 3920 on March 1 and 8, 
1994. Testifying before the committee, DNFSB chair Conway contended that DOE was not 
self-regulating in regards to its defense nuclear facilities. He mentioned that nuclear facilities 
were subject to federal environmental laws and were overseen by agencies as diverse as the 
EPA, the Department of Transportation, the Mine Safety and Health Administration, the 
NRC, the DNFSB's own recommendations, and state environmental statutes. He went on to 
maintain that safety at these facilities stemmed from technically qualified personnel adhering 
to clear and specific safety principles and standards and that licensing, regulation, external 
oversight, and enforcement authority could not create safe conditions on their own. This DN- 
FSB opposition contributed to H.R. 3920's demiseg5. 
A 1998 governmental report on DOE nuclear facilities provides the following perspective 
on the historical and contemporary factors influencing DOE's regulatory regime and the 
emergence of legislation such as H.R. 3920. 
Until the mid-1980s, DOE's regulatory history was shaped by the authorities for the 
principal missions of the Department and its predecessors: nuclear weapons and nuclear 
power. Under the authority [of] the Manhattan Project and the Atomic Energy Act 
(AEA) and its various amendments, for nearly half a century DOE and its predecessors 
operated the vast majority of the Federal government's nuclear research and production 
facilities essentially exempt from outside regulation. This self-regulation excluded 
other Federal agencies, States, local jurisdictions, and the general public from participa- 
tion in health and safety oversight and decision-making for these activities. The 1970s 
and 1980s saw enactment of major environmental legislation applicable to DOE, grow- 
ing public awareness and concern about the health and safety management of the DOE 
nuclear complex, successful lawsuits, and the winding down of the Cold War. As a re- 
sult of these and other factors, DOE gradually has become subject to increasing envi- 
ronmental regulation and other forms of oversight. Nonetheless, today DOE continues 
to self-regulate major aspects of its nuclear operations, including all worker safety; al- 
most all of the design, operation, and decommissioning of its nuclear facilities; and 
some of its environmental discharges and waste management96. 
5.2. Ahearne report 
Legislative pressure, as manifest in H.R. 3920 and the accompanying hearing, as well as 
the political, legal, and regulatory environment, led to a January 1995 announcement by En- 
ergy Secretary Hazel 07Leary of the formation of a committee to explore placing DOE nu- 
clear activities under additional federal agency regulation9'. This committee, chaired by Dr. 
John Ahearne of Duke University and known as the Ahearne Committee, met throughout 
that year and issued its report in December 1995. 
The Ahearne report presents an exhaustive portrait of regulatory issues confronting DOE 
nuclear facilities. Focusing on the current regulatory roles played by NRC and DNFSB, this 
report examined what it saw as the strengths and weaknesses of each of these organizations. 
Committee members noted NRC's long experience in nuclear safety regulation, its posses- 
sion of an existing regulatory structure, and the presence of numerous experienced personnel 
with relevant scientific and technical expertise along with flexible hiring authority. These 
panelists also noted the potential for inertia at NRC in responding to new regulatory respon- 
sibilities and the difficulty it would face coping with the national security issues of DOE's 
defense nuclear facilities as opposed to the operating and regulatory environments of com- 
mercial nuclear facilitiesy8. 
Concerning DNFSB, Ahearne panelists noted DNFSB's experienced scientific and techni- 
cal personnel, its maturing knowledge of DOE's defense nuclear complex, and its relative 
newness contributing to greater latitude in its ability to adopt flexible regulatory models to 
accommodate the great diversity of DOE's nuclear facilities. Conversely, Ahearne commit- 
tee members expressed concern about the DNFSB's lack of enforcement powers, a percep- 
tion that it is not regarded as being sufficiently open and having to answer to the same checks 
and balances as other regulators, and the Board's limited size and budget99. 
These factors, coupled with concern over regulatory duplication between NRC and DN- 
FSB, led to the following determination: 
Neither NRC nor the DNFSB was designed to carry out the kinds of responsibilities re- 
quired of a regulator of facility safety at the DOE nuclear complex. Both would have to 
undergo significant changes before they could adequately meet those responsibilities. 
The Committee did not determine which of the two agencies could more readily un- 
dergo these changes. Instead, we present two options for facility operator-NRC with a 
more flexible approach and incorporating the resources of the DNFSB, or a restructured 
and enlarged DNFSB. We urge that a prompt decision be made on which should be the 
facility regulator so that the move to external regulation of facility safety can proceed 
expeditiously. In the meantime, actions to implement external regulation of the two 
other areas of nuclear safety-worker safety and environmental protection--can and 
should proceed independentlyto0. 
Given the context of this observation, the Ahearne report prescribed the following concern- 
ing DOE nuclear facility regulation and safety: 
1. Nearly all safety aspects at DOE's nuclear facilities and sites should be externally 
regulated. 
2. Existing agencies rather than a new agency should have this responsibility. 
3. DOE needed to maintain a strong internal safety management system under any regula- 
tory regimelo'. 
The report elaborated on its reasons for reaching these findings by contending that DOE 
should be externally regulated for the same reasons industry and other federal facilities are 
and that external regulation could meet the demands of both safety and national security if 
managed properly. It went on to contend that credibility was critical to the success of safety 
regulation and DOE's missions and that safety regulation needed to be effective and promote 
efficiency. The following observation on regulatory credibility is particularly salient: 
The inherent conflict of interest between mission and self-regulation of safety at DOE, 
aggravated by a long legacy of secrecy, is at the root of many of the safety problems in 
the nuclear complex. External regulation would end that conflict by placing regulatory 
authority in bodies that are, . . . independent, impartial, and competent. It would im- 
prove public confidence in the safety of DOE operations by making them subject to the 
same kind of independent regulation that applies to other public and private operations. 
It would enable the public, States, and Tribes to have opportunities for effective in- 
volvement in the regulation of safety at DOE facilities-as they do with similar facili- 
ties in the private sector. Finally, only independent, external regulation can ensure the 
stable regulatory framework . . . that is required to ensure credibility. The Department 
has been unsuccessful in its attempts to achieve credibility under self-regulation and the 
level of frustration at the current regulatory regime remains high within the Depart- 
ment, its laboratories, and its contractors, just as the credibility of its safety efforts re- 
mains low in the world outside. We believe that external regulation is essential to earn- 
ing the public confidence the Department seeks and needs to free itself to cany out its 
important national missions'02. 
Specific governmental organizational changes recommended in the Ahearne report were 
that an existing agency such as the NRC and the DNFSB regulate DOE nuclear facilities and 
that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulate worker protection 
at DOE nuclear facilities, unless such regulation would cause significant interference with 
maintaining facility safety. EPA should continue regulating environmental protection mat- 
ters at DOE nuclear facilities under existing environmental laws, and states with EPA and 
OSHA authorized programs or individual facility safety regulators maintain existing roles in 
environmental protection, facility safety, and worker protection comparable to those now 
used in the private sector. Committee members contended that these and othcr recommended 
changes would strengthen, streamline, and simplify safety regulation at DOE nuclear facili- 
ties while drawing clearer and simpler lines of responsibility and ac~ountability"'~. 
5.3. DNFSB 's response to Ahearne 
The Ahearne report did not receive a favorable evaluation at the DNFSB. Although agree- 
ing with some report conclusions, it strongly disagreed with others. Testifying before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on March 6, 1997, Board chair Conway commented that 
public trust in DOE would not be increased by establishing another federal agency to regu- 
late its activities. He also questioned whether such additional regulation would improve 
safety at DOE nuclear facilities and cited figures from the NRC in which that agency con- 
tended it would need 1,100-1,600 additional full-time employees and an annual budget in- 
crease of $150-200 million if it were to assume additional regulatory responsibility for DOE. 
Speaking for the Board, Conway went on to observe: "We know of no organization in gov- 
ernment or private industry that reduces personnel or response costs when additional regula- 
tory authorities are imposed upon it. The opposite occurs"'04. 
DNFSB member Joseph DiNunno served on the Ahearne panel and was also critical of its 
findings. He criticized what he saw as insufficient factual rigor and objectivity in parts of the 
report. DiNunno went on to mention DOE'S current subjection to many more statutory envi- 
ronmental requirements than in the period before 1980 when most conditions requiring envi- 
ronmental remediation were created. He also observed that regulatory processes involving 
statutorily provided public participation opportunities may need to be limited for national se- 
curity reasons and for programs requiring expedited clean-uplo'. 
DiNunno also asserted that DOE should follow regulatory principles emphasizing the fol- 
lowing characteristics: 
1. Attacking current instead of historical regulatory problems. 
2. Regulating only to the extent needed to achieve the desired behavior. 
3. Facilitating technical solutions instead of constructing unnecessary process impediments. 
4. Allowing flexibility in establishing requirements tailored to work hazards. 
5. Structuring regulations to encourage good safety practices instead of fearing penalties. 
6. Minimizing costs and maximizing benefits. 
7. Minimizing regulatory overlap and duplication. 
8. Encouraging intra-government ~ooperation''~. 
Board opposition to external regulation of DOE nuclear facilities did not diminish with the 
passage of time. A November 1998 DNFSB report for Congress on this subject expanded on the 
Board's earlier opposition to external regulation. This document maintained that shifting regula- 
tory control of its nuclear facilities to an external agency would diminish the importance of na- 
tional security in DOE plant operations. It also observed that such external regulation would be 
incapable of handling DOE's nuclear weapons testing, maintenance, stewardship, and clean-up 
programs and commented on the improvements that the DNFSB and DOE had achleved over 
the past decade in defense nuclear facility safety and environmental protection programs"'. 
This report also heralded what it regarded as the advantages of continuing DNFSB oversight of 
defense nuclear facilities. Specific benefits of continuing existing oversight arrangements in- 
cluded the lack of undue interference with critical national defense and security functions at these 
facilities and the enhanced cost-efficiency of Board oversight as evidenced by its total Fiscal Year 
(FY) 1999 budget of $16.5 million for all defense nuclear facilities as opposed to the $3 million 
spent by NRC per reactor per year in its commercial regulatory and licensing activities'''. 
Additional advantages of maintaining the current regulatory regime cited by DNFSB were 
the flexibility provided by Board oversight, that DNFSB recommendations could be ac- 
cepted or rejected, and that the Board is a neutral party interested in safety and achieving 
oversight success. Further attributes include the public availability of Board recommenda- 
tions unless national security considerations prevail, the presence of a well-established DN- 
FSB organizational structure and technical expertise, and that shifting regulatory structure 
would disrupt progress being made under Board recornrnendati~ns'~~. 
DNFSB opposition to creating a new regulatory regime for defense nuclear facilities was 
also demonstrated by its assertion that a new regulatory structure would create a time-con- 
suming and cumbersome legal framework, increase the costs of bringing facilities into com- 
pliance with new rules, result in less safety at defense nuclear facilities, and ultimately di- 
minish DOE's stature as a center of nuclear technical e~cellence"~.  
6. Proposed DOE elimination 
An additional complication for DNFSB arose with the onset of the 104th Congress in 
1995. The declared intention of many members of the newly ascendant Republican majority 
was abolishing DOE and transferring some of its programs to other federal agencies while 
privatizing others. On April 16, 1996, Senator Rod Grams (R-MN) introduced S. 1678 the 
"Department of Energy Abolition Act""'. This legislation called for the establishment of an 
independent executive branch agency called the Energy Programs Resolution Agency that 
would oversee DOE's dismantlement. Where DNFSB activities are concerned, S. 1678 
called for the creation of a Defense Nuclear Programs Agency that would be part of the De- 
partment of Defense (DOD) and have jurisdiction over military uses of nuclear energy and 
nuclear weapons, be responsible for environmental restoration at defense nuclear facilities, 
and supervise operations at Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National 
~aboratoriesl 1 2 .  
This legislation did not pass during the 104th Congress due to DOE-initiated budget and 
staff reductions, DOE's vigorous defense of its mission, and divisions among congressional 
Republicans over DOE's future but it did prompt legislation with similar intent in the 105th 
C~ngress"~.  Rep. Todd Tiahrt (R-KS) introduced H.R. 1577 on May 8, 1997, with 45 co- 
sponsors. Although this legislation also failed to pass, the presence of a significant number of 
cosponsors and the persistence of anti-DOE sentiment within Congress were clear warning 
signs to DOE and federal agencies doing business with DOE (such as DNFSB) of the need to 
change ongoing  operation^"^. 
Congressional concerns with DOE covered a variety of issues. During a September 19, 
1996, House National Security Committee DOE oversight hearing, Rep. Duncan Hunter 
(R-CA) maintained that DOE was not fulfilling its commitments to maintain the safety, se- 
curity, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Hunter went on to criticize the 
Clinton administration for giving DOE weapons scientists, engineers, and skilled laborers 
the impossible mission of maintaining a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile without nuclear 
testing, giving complex workers insufficient resources and support to modernize the nu- 
clear weapons complex, and allowing the departure of skilled personnel from DOE's nu- 
clear weapons programs115. 
A Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing on September 4, 1996, pro- 
vided some insight into DNFSB thinking on the possible abolition of DOE. Testifying before 
the committee, Board member John Crawford stated that it would be ill advised to transfer 
DNFSB functions to DOD since it would not be possible for the Board to provide indepen- 
dent and critical evaluation of defense nuclear facilities. Crawford also maintained that Con- 
gress had made a wise decision in crafting the 1946 Atomic Energy Act when it created a 
separation between DOD and the AEC for the production, delivery, and possible use of nu- 
clear weapons' 16. 
He also asserted that there had been a decline in the qualifications of military officers as- 
signed to DOE'S nuclear weapons programs which he partially attributed to a belief among 
military officers that nuclear weapons specialization was not career enhancing. In addition, 
he stressed his belief that current overall capabilities of DOE nuclear weapons personnel did 
not meet the requisite high standards. A way Crawford saw of rectifying this technical quali- 
fications problem would be the creation of a joint nuclear weapons directorate. A military of- 
ficer or civilian would head such an organization and would report directly to the Secretaries 
of Energy and Defense and serve a term of six-to-eight years'". 
A trenchant critique of DOE operations was provided by the testimony of Jerry Taylor the 
Natural Resources Studies director from the libertarian think-tank, the Cato Institute. Tay- 
lor's critique favored eliminating DOE and replacing the DNFSB with a National Nuclear 
Weapons Agency (NNWA) under the direction of a sub-cabinet civilian official to supervise 
national nuclear weapons programs, civilian radioactive waste, and weapons clean-up opera- 
tions. NNWA would operate under DOD's budget and weapons program review. The Cato 
Institute analysis also expressed the belief that transferring weapons-related programming 
from DOE to DOD was preferred because defense-related activities belonged to the agency 
and budget responsible for national defense, putting such programs in an existing department 
would prevent bureaucratic "mission creep" which it saw as occurring with nuclear weapons 
at the AEC, and merging nuclear weapons producers and customers produced enhanced na- 
tional strategy coordination. This merged administrative structure would, in Taylor's assess- 
ment, give the American public a more honest accounting of national defense expenditures 
instead of spreading them throughout the federal budget'I8. 
7. DOE-NRC external regulation pilot project 
Ahearne Committee report findings concerning external regulation of DOE nuclear facili- 
ties were accepted and endorsed by Energy Secretary O'Leary. She responded by creating a 
DOE Working Group on External Regulation, which issued a December 1996 report to pro- 
vide recommendations for implementing Ahearne report findings in this area. DOE's Work- 
ing Group determined that NRC should be the principal external regulator and that moving to 
external regulation should be phased in over 10 years. Following interagency negotiations 
between DOE and NRC, Federico Pena (O'Leary's successor) and NRC Chair Shirley Jack- 
son agreed to the following measures: 
To pursue NRC regulation of DOE nuclear facilities at a June 1997 meeting. 
DOE and NRC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in November 1997 
designating the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) as the site of the first 
pilot project. 
Individual facilities at Oak Ridge at Savannah River designated as future sites of NRC 
external reg~lation"~. 
Testifying before a House Commerce Committee subcommittee on February 11, 1997, 
Acting Energy Secretary Charles Curtis said DOE would submit legislation to Congress that 
year on implementing external regulationlZ0. Such relatively quick movement by DOE pro- 
duced an initially positive congressional response to external regulation of DOE nuclear fa- 
cilities. House Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Energy and Power Chair Rep. Dan 
Schaefer (R-CO) expressed such sentiment in a May 20, 1998 hearing: 
I want to say from the start that I feel this is one of the most significant issues facing the 
Department of Energy today. Independent regulation gets at the crux of DOE's biggest 
management problem-the cleanup of sites within the nuclear weapons complex. If the 
Department knew that a regulator with full enforcement authority was watching over its 
shoulders, many DOE sites would be managed more efficiently and safely. Had such a 
watchdog been required for DOE sites from the beginning I think we could have avoided 
many of the massive environmental problems that the DOE complex faces todayI2'. 
8. GAO evaluation of DOE external regulation 
A less sanguine assessment of DOE'S external regulation strategy was provided by a May 
1998 GAO report for the House Science Committee. This report contended that DOE's ac- 
tual position on external regulation was unclear because its decision to conduct pilot projects 
(such as the NRC MOU) represented a shift in its formerly strong endorsement of external 
regulation of all DOE facilities. GAO observed that this change by DOE caused both the 
NRC and OSHA to question DOE's actual commitment to external r e g ~ l a t i o n ' ~ ~ .  
Additional GAO findings asserted that while the DOE-NRC pilot project at LBNL would 
provide useful insights, it did not represent the size and complexity of DOE's overall nuclear 
complex and would not yield the practical data necessary for addressing numerous critical exter- 
nal regulation issues. For instance, the LBNL, Oak Ridge, and Savannah River sites covered by 
the pilot projects do not contain nuclear reactors, weapons plants, or heavily contaminated facil- 
ities. Such defense and environmental sites constitute 80 percent of DOE'S nuclear complex and 
represent the environments responsible for initiating DOE exploration of external reg~lation'~'. 
GAO also criticized DOE for not integrating OSHA with NRC in its pilot projects. The 
absence of such integration, according to GAO, resulted in the creation of several working 
groups and steering committees on external regulation of DOE facilities within these agen- 
cies. A consequent result of these multifaceted administrative approaches sees these three 
agencies proceeding on different tracks and schedules toward extcrnal regulation without 
having a single structure to integrate their respective positions and strategiesI2'. 
GAO's evaluation of the DOE-NRC pilot project also observed that defense nuclear facil- 
ities represent a significant part of DOE's nuclear complex and the substantive contributions 
of DNFSB in improving safety at these facilities would have to be included if DOE desired a 
complete exploration of all relevant external regulation issues125. 
DOE Deputy Secretary of Energy Elizabeth A. Moler criticized GAO's finding that 
DOE's position on external regulation was unclear or inconsistent. Moler maintained that 
there would be clear benefits from external regulation of DOE facilities and that the transi- 
tion to external regulation required careful design and management. She also asserted that 
DOE intended to overcome legal, institutional, and technical difficulties on external regula- 
tion by working closely with the NRC and OSHA to propose classes of DOE facilities that 
could be subjected to a "responsibly implemented" external regulatory regime126. 
Moler's comments, though, could not prevent a change in the initially favorable congres- 
sional response to proposed external regulation of DOE nuclear facilities to which the critical 
GAO report probably contributed. This shift in sentiment is best expressed in the Senate 
Armed Services Committee's May 11, 1998, report on the 1999 Defense Department budget 
authorization section covering DNFSB: 
The committee is not convinced that external regulation of new or existing DOE defense 
nuclear facilities will increase safety, decrease cost, or improve operational efficiency at 
such facilities. The committee notes that transfer of the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant 
from DOE to NRC regulation cost over $200 million and took three years to complete. 
The committee is concerned that the implementation of an additional external regulation 
approach could draw scarce resources away from high priority, compliance driven clean-up 
actions and critical national security activities, with little added benefit. The committee be- 
lieves that no decisions should be made or actions taken until the findings of the DNFSB and 
the comments of the Secretary of Energy and Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Cornrnis- 
sion have been provided and the ongoing external regulation pilot program is completed. The 
committee will be extensively involved in any movement toward an alternative external reg- 
ulation approachI2'. 
9. Congressional assessments of DNFSB performance 
DNFSB's congressional oversight committees have generally given favorable appraisals of 
Board activities. The Senate Armed Services committee 1999 budget authorization report for 
DNFSB noted that the Board "continues to provide exceptional and effective external oversight 
with a budget that equals about one-tenth of one percent of total Atomic Energy Defense hnd- 
ing"128. The previous year this committee also praised DNFSB for successhlly pushing DOE to 
improve nuclear safety and that the Board's non-punitive review process created an improved 
safety culture at DOE facilities. An additional committee endorsement of DNFSB accomplish- 
ments was its assertion that the Board plays an essential role in improving DOE operations and 
making them more accountable and that DNFSB should continue in its current role129. 
The best illustration of DNFSB's political capital is reflected in its budget authorizations 
over its first decade. From an initial appropriation of $7 million for FY 1989, the Board's 
budget reached a total of $17 million for FY 1998 representing remarkable growth during a 
decade noted for emphasizing federal budgetary deficits and spending rate growth reductions 
for numerous federal agenciesI3O. 
10. Concern over DOE nuclear complex technical expertise 
In addition to its clean-up and safety oversight responsibilities, DNFSB members will 
have to contend with numerous additional issues in the years ahead. One of these issues con- 
cerns the technical qualifications of workers in the defense nuclear complex to which the 
Board alluded in Recommendation 93-6. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Com- 
mittee on March 23, 1994, Conway expressed his concern about this emerging issue: 
One of the biggest technical challenges and uncertainties results from the physical con- 
dition of facilities in the nuclear weapons complex. As facilities age and less attention 
is paid to their maintenance and upkeep, their condition will degrade. As key operating 
personnel depart, knowledge of facility and weapons designs and contents will erode, 
and safety will be reducedI3'. 
DOE itself in an October 1998 report by that agency's Inspector General noted the precari- 
ous state of technical knowledge and expertise. This report acknowledged that DOE had not de- 
veloped a coordinated or integrated program to preserve the knowledge base of a downsized 
nuclear weapons complex. The report went on to show that while individual nuclear sites were 
conducting archiving and knowledge capture activities, there was little consistency among 
these sites in terms of planning, approach, and progress achieved. This situation, consequently, 
stemmed from DOE's Office of Defense Programs not assigning programmatic responsibility 
for developing and implementing a plan for knowledge preservation a ~ t i v i t i e s ' ~ ~ .  
A consequence of not having a coordinated knowledge preservation approach in view of 
retirements and downsizing at DOE nuclear facilities was also expressed in this report: 
Without a coordinated, integrated program for knowledge preservation, the Department 
risks not identifying and using all information that would provide continued high confi- 
dence in the nuclear stockpile. Specifically, the Department cannot ensure that all rele- 
vant information will be included in a comprehensive, well organized, and easily acces- 
sible knowledge base, and that priorities for the capture of data, information, and 
knowledge, are appropriate and consistent throughout the nuclear weapons complex. In 
addition, disparities in knowledge preservation planning, approach, and progress may 
raise impediments to the integration of various site a ~ t i v i t i e s ' ~ ~ .  
Concern over the future quality and viability of DOE's nuclear workers were not confined 
to DNFSB or DOE. They extended to Congress as well, which authorized the creation of a 
Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise in the 1997 and 1998 
National Defense Authorization The Commission was charged with developing a 
plan for recruiting and retaining requisite scientific, engineering, and technical personnel 
within DOE's nuclear complex in order for DOE to maintain a safe, reliable, and long-term 
nuclear weapons stockpile without underground nuclear testing. After a year of work, the 
Commission issued its report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy on March 1, 1999'35. 
The Commission's report contained many positive findings such as stable funding, the co- 
herence of the Stockpile Stewardship Program intended to assure the safety and reliability of 
U.S. nuclear weapons in the absence of testing, and the dedication and talent of the current 
workforce at U.S. defense nuclear facilities. However, these attributes were weakened by nu- 
merous deficiencies including an aging workforce, a tight job market for requisite profes- 
sional skills, and the absence of a long-term hiring plan'36. 
Specific Commission findings reveal a workforce uncertain of its future in light of down- 
sizing and a perception that nuclear weapons production is a declining industry, the demo- 
graphic aging of a workforce with between one-third and one-half of the workforce at five fa- 
cilities being between 45 and 65, engineering undergraduates not being knowledgeable about 
DOE laboratories and production facilities, undergraduate enrollments in science and engi- 
neering declining by 19 percent since the peak year of 1983, frustration from DOE work- 
place micromanagement, and insufficient contractor flexibility in hiring and retaining quali- 
fied per~onnel'~'. 
Three particularly salient commission findings stand out. One deals with defense nuclear 
workforce concerns about the strength of the U.S. government's long-term commitment to 
nuclear deterrence and stockpile stewardship, doubts about the continued existence of some 
existing nuclear weapons complex facilities, and fear of fkrther personnel reductions in the 
nuclear weapons workforce. A second point is the declining number of college students in 
relevant science and engineering fields at a time when overall economic needs for these grad- 
uates are growing. A final noteworthy development is the significant percentage of interna- 
tional students in nuclear graduate programs, which complicates recruitment in a profession 
requiring a security clearance and U.S. c i t i~ensh ip '~~ .  
Several recommendations were proposed by the Commission to rectify these shortcomings. 
These included Congress and the administration reinforcing the national commitment and sense 
of mission to the nuclear weapons complex of its vital role in national security; completing an in- 
tegrated, long-term weapons stockpile life extension plan; strengthening the DOWDOE rela- 
tionship to ensure enhanced budget and program coordination for national security needs; taking 
immediate action to achieve greater DOE laboratory coordination; and expediting improvements 
and the efficient use of the nuclear weapons production complex. Additional Commission rec- 
ommendations included establishing clear authority lines within DOE, establishing and imple- 
menting a priority plan for replenishing crucial technical workforce needs, giving contractors 
greater freedom in personnel matters, expanding training and career planning programs to ac- 
commodate a dramatically changed workforce environment, expanding the use of former nu- 
clear weapons program employees, creating a permanent Defense Programs Advisory Commit- 
tee within DOE, and enhancing congressional oversight of the nuclear weapons program'39. 
11. Conclusion 
The responsibilities of overseeing safety conditions at defense nuclear facilities and clean- 
ing up environmental damage at these sites will remain a long-term commitment of DNFSB, 
DOE, U.S. government environmental policy, and U.S. taxpayers. A 1996 DOE environmen- 
tal issues analysis revealed that the final projected clean-up dates for the five most expensive 
nuclear facility clean-up sites would be 2070 for Hanford, 2045 for the Idaho National Engi- 
neering Laboratory, 2070 for Oak Ridge, 2055 for Rocky Flats, and 2050 for Savannah 
River. Surveillance and monitoring activities at these facilities will continue beyond these 
dates with these particular programs projected to conclude by 2070i40. 
Besides its ongoing statutory responsibilities, DNFSB members and personnel will oper- 
ate in a continually changing political and environmental policy cauldron. Protracted uncer- 
tainty over the status of the DOE-NRC external regulation pilot project and what this may 
mean for the Board's future operations will remain on the radar screen of DNFSB personnel 
for the foreseeable future. 
Attempts to eliminate DOE have failed for now. However, the fact that such attempts were 
made and attracted the support of numerous members of Congress illustrates that DOE'S po- 
litical capital within the present Congress is not high. DNFSB appears to have sufficient 
credibility in Congress to survive a now hypothetical termination of DOE. The Board's sta- 
tus and responsibilities in the event of this occurring, though, cannot be predicted. 
Another event that could affect the DNFSB would be an accident at a defense nuclear facility 
that threatens public safety outside the boundaries of the facility. A prompt and effective response 
to such an incident could bolster DNFSB's credibility in public opinion even if such a catastrophic 
occurrence was damaging to a DOE laboratory, the DOE, or other responsible political entities. 
Conversely, the slightest public or governmental perception of an inept response to such an inci- 
dent by the DNFSB, could produce fatal consequences to its institutional and political survival. 
Significant changes in the international security environment will also affect DNFSB op- 
erations. In a five-year strategic plan released on September 30, 1997, the Board listed the 
following two items as key assumptions: 
1. Current U.S. national security policy affecting DOE nuclear weapons stockpile stew- 
ardship and management remains unchanged. 
2. The administration maintains its moratorium on the underground testing of nuclear 
weapons. Resumption of full-scale underground testing would require a major shift in 
Board resources for oversightI4'. 
Making and holding such assumptions during the middle of the Clinton administration is 
probably a sign of political prudence. However, recent events such as the 1998 nuclear tests 
conducted by India and Pakistan could weaken U.S. willingness to continue its nuclear weap- 
ons testing moratorium. In addition, concern over possible Chinese espionage at DOE labo- 
ratories has increased worries about the security of the United States' nuclear deterrent. 
The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) administered by DOE'S Los Alamos, Lawrence 
Livermore, and Sandia laboratories provides ongoing maintenance and reliability of the U.S. nu- 
clear deterrent. This program uses scientific advances in computer and experimental simulation 
to assess U.S. nuclear weapons reliability without weapons testing'42. Despite Clinton adminis- 
tration support, this program's feasibility and reliability have been subjected to severe criticism. 
A 1998 National Defense University and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report 
on the hture direction of U.S. nuclear policy was extremely critical of SSP. This document 
noted that maintaining the safety, reliability, and performance of U.S. nuclear weapons with- 
out underground nuclear testing represented the highest risk of U.S. nuclear deterrence strat- 
egy, that U.S. nuclear weapons were not designed for indefinite stockpile life, and that no 
program that could substitute for nuclear weapons testing prior to the United States 1992 test 
moratorium decision. Additional criticisms of this report include SSP conclusions being 
high-risk because they cannot be validated by nuclear testing, diminished nuclear stockpile 
diversity due to nuclear disarmament treaties, concern over retaining personnel with techni- 
cal expertise for weapons development and maintenance, the inability of the U.S. manufac- 
turing complex to support serial nuclear weapons production, and the need for tritium pro- 
duction to sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile given tritium's limited half-life and the 
restricted ability to recycle tritium from dismantled nuclear weapons143. 
It is possible these and other potential national security concerns may lead the next presi- 
dential administration to resume nuclear testing. Such an event would have a significant im- 
pact on DNFSB operations requiring additional congressional appropriations and hiring 
qualified personnel to execute the Board's newly expanded responsibilities. 
An additional issue with which the DNFSB will have to contend is the matter of nuclear waste 
repository siting. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act is due to be renewed in 1999 with Nevada's 
Yucca Mountain appearing to be the prime candidate for the United States' permanent nuclear 
waste repository. The need to resolve h s  issue has been accelerated by an October 1998 federal 
court decision holding DOE liable for radioactive waste storage costs at three closed New En- 
gland nuclear power plants. Opposition to selecting Yucca Mountain has come from the Clinton 
administration and Nevada's congressional delegation, led by Senator Hany Reid (D-NV)'44. 
Such opposition to Yucca Mountain failed to stop the House Commerce Committee's 40-5 
vote on April 21, 1999, to approve the shipment of nuclear waste to the Nevada Test Site by 
June 30,2003. The Senate approved this legislation 64-34 on February 10,2000 and the House 
approved it 252-167 on March 22, 2000. This legislation had not received presidential ap- 
proval or veto at the end of April 2000'45. 
Whatever happens in the decision over establishing a permanent nuclear waste repository 
will involve DNFSB personnel in a significant way as they monitor the transportation, dis- 
posal, and storage of nuclear waste. It will also force the American public and its leaders to 
face the reality that a safe and permanent disposal location for nuclear waste must be found 
regardless of the emotional opposition such disposal will inevitably generate. The continuing 
and ongoing involvement of the DNFSB in consulting with local leaders and communities in 
affected areas can enhance public understanding of this issue and potentially alleviate uncer- 
tainty and concerns among the affected populations about possible health, safety, and envi- 
ronmental impacts of such di~posal'~'. 
Board operations could also be improved by reducing the number of congressional com- 
mittees to which they report. Depending on the issue(s) in question, DNFSB board members 
must testify before the appropriations, armed services, and energy committees of the House 
and Senate as well as other committees as circumstances may require. Assigning one con- 
gressional committee in each of these bodies to oversee DNFSB operations would reduce 
congressional costs as well as DNFSB's cost and allow for more efficient oversight of Board 
activities. 
Public knowledge of DNFSB activities has been enhanced in several ways. The Board held 
29 public meetings at or near defense nuclear facilities between 1990 and 1997 and an additional 
29 public meetings in Washington, DC, during this period. It maintains a public reading room in 
Washngton, DC, and bound volumes of public meeting transcripts between 1990 and 1997 gen- 
erated nearly 7,000 pages of material and represent a portion of the approximately 1.75 million 
pages of records made available for public viewing during this period'". 
The agency's Website <http://www.dnfsb.gov/> is also a useful research source. It con- 
tains all of the Board's annual reports, recommendations, correspondence, technical issue re- 
ports, weekly reports on staff visits to affected defense nuclear facilities such as Hanford, 
Oak Ridge, Pantex, Rocky Flats, and Savannah River, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
policies and procedures, and biographical information on Board members. 
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board was created in response to concern over the 
safety of the United States' defense nuclear facilities. It has been relatively successful in fulfill- 
ing its responsibilities and maintaining a good relationship with both the DOE and Congress. 
Uncertainty over possible future developments in national security, energy policy, environmen- 
tal policy, and congressional attitudes toward DOE make predicting DNFSB's long-term future 
uncertain. Nevertheless, it appears likely that the DNFSB or a comparable organization will be 
a part of the U.S. government landscape for the foreseeable future given the long-term impor- 
tance of ensuring safe operations at the United States' defense nuclear facilities. 
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